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COMMANDING AND OBEYING 
JASPER DOOMEN 
An appeal to 'good' and 'bad' actions in religions is evident. Stealing, 
e.g., is considered to be wrong, whereas giving to the poor is prescribed as 
good. In this article, I will examine to what extent it may be maintained 
that such moral elements are indeed inherent in divine commands or ex-
hortations; I will focus on the Christian faith. In section 1, two positions 
are outlined. Those who indicate some things to be good or bad as such, 
irrespective of God's ruling, and the thinkers who emphasize God's radi-
cal power and who state that God decides these matters, thus arguing a 
radical omnipotence, are juxtaposed, although their positions may not 
differ greatly from an ethical (or meta-ethical) viewpoint. 
Section 2 is focused on the consequences of these alternative outlooks. 
If there are such things as good and bad actions, it is important to find out 
why these are respectively prescribed and abhorred (subsection 2.1). A 
number of Biblical passages may illustrate the reasons to display a certain 
behavior. Subsection 2.2 briefly explores the second perspective stated in 
section l. 
Section 3 presents an alternative; the goal is to be as critical as pos-
sible in analyzing the reasons to adhere to the commands one is to obey. 
In particular, it is inquired which role selfishness plays; is an act of altru-
ism possible? I have not limited the research to religion here, but have 
tried to find a broader scope. In section 4, some relevant remaining meta-
ethical questions are dealt with. Some Christian philosophers have, e.g., 
appealed to intuitions in order to account for the existence of goodness. 
In this article, I attempt to approach matters with an open view, not 
dismissing any position a priori. This should lead to a consistent whole 
and to credible results. 
1. The nature of 'goodness' from a religious perspective 
The main question addressed in this article, whether moral acts can 
be performed within a religious scope, raises the subsequent one on what 
basis goodness can be acknowledged to exist. Whether this can exist at all 
is a more fundamental question, which will be dealt with later, although 
it is connected with the issue of the source of goodness, which is the sub-
ject-matter of this section. 
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In Christian philosophy, two positions can rudimentarily be distin-
guished. On the one hand, it is stated that goodness exists as such, God's 
commands reflecting this. On the other hand, it is deemed to be at God's 
disposal to determine which acts are good and which aren't, rendering 
goodness contingent in this respect. (The issue already, in nuce, receives 
attention from Plato; in an early work, the question is put forward 
whether something is approved ofby the gods because it is pious, or, con-
versely, pious because they approve ofit1.) Of course, middle positions are 
also possible and have even been defended, but as this is of minor rel-
evance to this article, I will merely deal with the two options mentioned. 
Bonaventura's line of thought is an example of the first position. 
He limits God's power by stating: 
"God is omnipotent, but in such a way that no culpable acts are attrib-
uted to Him, such as lying and wanting evil."("[ ... ] Deus est omnipotens, ita 
tamen, quod ei non attribuuntur actus culpabiles, utpote mentiri et malle 
velle [ ... ] .")2; "God's will is so right that it can in no way stray." ("[Voluntas 
Dei] sic est recta, ut nullo modo potest obliquari [ ... ]")3. 
A (or the) right way to act is presupposed here, independent of God's 
decisions. Further, 
"The divine omnipotence, through everything, is irreprehensible, since 
it only prescribes, prohibits, or suggests justly; it merely acts in a good way, 
and permits nothing unjustly." ("[Divina omnipotentia] per omnia est 
irreprehensibilis, quia nihil nisi iuste praecipit, prohibit, vel consulit; nihil 
agit nisi bene, nihil permittit iniuste") 4. 
This presupposes a (or the) just way to proceed, again independent of 
God's decisions. In a similar vein, Thomas Aquinas indicates some acts to 
be good or bad by their kind.("[. .. ] quidam actus sunt boni ex genere [ ... ]. 
Quidam vero sunt actus mali ex genere [ ... ]")5. 
Even Damiani, famous for his emphasis on God's omnipotence 6, main• 
tains that God can't perform an evil act: 
"It is clear that God is unable to do something bad, just as He is igno-
rant in this regard. For He is unable to lie, or commit perjury, or do some-
thing unjust, nor does He know how to:•("[ ... ] videlicet quicquid rnalum est, 
sicut non [Deus] potest agere, ita nescit agere. Non enim potest aut scit 
mentiri, vel peiurare, vel iniustum aliquid facere") 7• 
' Plato, Euthyphro, 10a. 
2 Bonaventura, Bl'eviloquium, pars 1, cap. 7 (p. 215). In each instance where I 
have translated a section myself, I have included the original texts. The spelling of the 
original texts in English and French has been preserved, even if this conflicts with the 
present spelling. 
"Bonaventura, Op. cit., pars 1, cap. 9 (p. 217). 
4 Bonaventura, Op. cit., pars 1, cap. 9 (p. 218). 
·' Th. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la2ae, q. 92, art. 2 (p. 161). 
6 E.g., P. Damiani, De Divina Omnipotentia, 612 A, B (p. 448/449). 
'P. Damiani, Op. cit., 597 C (pp. 390/391, 392/393) (cf. 600 A (p. 400/401), 610 D 
(p. 442/443)). 
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It would not contribute to God's power to engage in such actions, so 
His being unable to perform them does not conflict with His omnipotence. 
From Damiani's presentation it appears that his view is similar to 
Bonaventura's with regard to the existence of goodness (and evil). Leibniz 
presents an additional argument: 
"I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are 
absolutely no rules concerning goodness or perfection in the nature of things 
or in the ideas that God has of them, and that the works of God are merely 
good because of this formal reason that God has made them. For if that were 
the case, God, knowing that He is their creator, would only have to observe 
them afterwards, and deem them good. [. .. ] Furthermore, by saying that 
things aren't good by any standard of goodness, but by God's will only, one 
destroys, it seems to me, without thinking, the entire l't}Ve of God and His 
entire glory."("[ ... ] je suis fort eloigne du sentiment de ceux qui soutiennent 
qu'il n'y a point de regles de bonte et de perfection dans la nature des choses 
ou dans les idees que Dieu en a, et que les ouvrages de Dieu ne sont hons que 
par cette raison formelle que Dieu les a faits. Car si cela estoit, Dieu sc,achant 
qu'il en est l'auteur, n'avoit que faire de les regarder par apres, et de les 
trouver hons[ ... ]. Aussi, disant que les choses ne sont bonnes par aucune 
regle de bonte, mais par la seule volonte de Dieu, on detruit, ce me semble, 
sans y penser, tout !'amour de Dieu, et toute sa gloire") 8• 
Leibniz, then, emphasizes the content of goodness and on that ground 
wants to cling to an absolute standard by which God abides. 
By contrast, one may argue that God's power is not limited in this 
respect, nor should it be, God Himself determining what it is for some-
thing to be good at all. Biel states, e.g., that it follows from God's omnipo-
tence that He can command someone to lie without this resulting in a sin9• 
Accordingly, that it is forbidden to lie - "Neither shalt thou bear false wit-
ness against thy neighbor." (Deuteronomy 5:20)- is a random given. God 
decides completely unhindered what 'good' and 'bad' mean. This is also 
Descartes' view: 
"[ ... ] there can be nothing whatsoever which does not depend on God. 
This applies not just to everything that subsists, but to all order, every law, 
and every reason for anything's being true or good. If this were not so, then 
[. . .] God would not have been completely indifferent with respect to the cre-
ation of what he did in fact create. If some reason for something's being good 
had existed prior to his preordination, this would have determined God to 
prefer those things which it was best to do. But on the contrary,just because 
he resolved to prefer those things which are now to be done, for this very 
reason, in the words of Genesis, 'they are very good'; in other words, the rea-
son for their goodness depends on the fact that he exercised his will to make 
them so" 10• 
8 G. Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique, § 2 (p. 1532). 
9 G. Biel, Collectorium circa Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, Book 3, Distinctio 38, 
Quaestio unica (Art. 2, Correl. 2), G. (pp. 649, 650). 
10 R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Sixth Set of Replies, p. 294. 
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It is difficult to assess the merits of these positions with regard to 
their claims about God's options and (possible) limitations. This would 
require a more intricate metaphysical theory than I would pretend to be 
able to proffer here; moreover, these thinkers do not, perhaps with the 
exception of Leibniz, really produce arguments why their position should 
be correct and, even if they had done so, in the absence of a covering, or 
- as is pertinent to this issue - God's eye view, the matter can't be resolved 
with a metaphysical analysis. 
It is, however, possible to evaluate the positions from a meta-ethical 
point ofviewll. According to the first approach, good and bad exist as ab-
solute standards 12• An account is needed why it is good to, e.g., give alms 
to the poor, or bad to lie. In the next section, a number of Biblical sections 
will be explored in order to find out whether an answer to this question 
can be found there. According to the second approach, in which God deter-
mines what 'good' and 'bad' actions are, an external criterion to obey Him 
is not available as it is supposed to be in the first approach, so the ques-
tion why this should be done presents itself here, too. 
2. The two options explored 
In this section, I will try to establish the tenability of the two positions 
outlined in the previous section. Firstly, I will, in subsection 2.1, evaluate 
the claims of those who argue that goodness as such exists from a religious 
(mainly Christian) point of view, and that it may provide a basis for act-
ing. Secondly, the basis of God's position as a fundamental lawgiver, to 
which the defenders of the second position adhere, will be investigated in 
subsection 2.2. Admittedly, the Bible - presumably having been written 
in an accessible style - doesn't convey a philosophical message 13, but that 
doesn't mean that the texts should not be analyzed critically. 
2.1. The basic 'goodness' as a motivational element 
There are a number of Biblical passages in which 'good' deeds are 
prescribed and 'bad' ones are forbidden. I will argue that the basis for 
complying with the norms according to which one is to behave and abstain-
ing from those one is to avoid has a different basis than an 
acknowledgement of their being 'correct' (or 'right') respectively 'wrong'. 
11 Meta-ethics deals with the basic notions in ethics, e.g., what 'good' and 'bad' mean 
(if anything). 'l'he next sections will present a more elaborate account than this one. 
'" Of course, it is argued that evil things are nothing, as they don't proceed from 
God {P. Damiani, Op. cit., 609 B (p. 436), 610 C, D (p. 442)), and that evil is to be con-
sidered an absence of goodness (e.g., Anselm, De Conceptu Virginali et De Originali 
Peccato, Cap. 5 (p. 146)); cf. Augustine, De Natura Boni, XVII, 17 (p. 454/455)). 
'" H. Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Cap. 13 (p. 167). 
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The revelation of the Ten Commandments is an obvious place to start. 
These are presented as the fundamental directives God imposes upon 
man. According to the first option, there would be something inherently 
'good' in obeying these commandments, or inherently 'wrong' in disobey-
ing them. It is clear that adhering to most, or possibly all of them would 
contribute to a stable society. The interdiction to murdeT (Deuteronomy 
5: 17), e.g., will, if observed, lead to a peaceful society in which people can 
prosper. It is, however, difficult to support the claim that the Command-
ments are supposed to represent moral values. 
Some of the Commandments are not motivated but simply postulated; 
they can't be helpful to this inquiry. In the case ofblasphemy, conversely, 
a reason is given. This consists in the fact that"[ ... ] the Lord will not hold 
him guiltless who takes His name in vain." (Deuteronomy 5:11). In this 
case, then, the (concealed) penalty which is to be bestowed upon the blas-
phemer is the basis for keeping to the norm. Similar accounts are given 
in Deuteronomy 28:15-68, where the curses for disobedience are described, 
In the New Testament, the negative effects of failing to comply are, 
on the whole, less pungent than in the Hebrew Bible and are presented 
more subtly. Still, the basis analysis is the same. Matthew 7:1-2 reads: 
"Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye 
shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to 
you again". The second verse gives the explanation - one shouldn't judge 
because of the negative effects for oneself - but even the first verse points 
to this: there is a necessary connection between the imperative and the 
consequence by the use of the conjunction 'that' ('hina') 14 . It is hard, then, 
to evade the conclusion that self-interest is the motivation to comply. This 
is also the way the 'golden rule't 5 is to be interpreted 16 . 
There are also passages in which the negative element is stressed -
e.g., Matthew 26:52 ("[ ... ] all they that take the sword shall perish with 
the sword.") - but the analysis is the same here: don't partake in 'bad' or 
'wrong' actions because they will reflect on you 17• 
The positive elements, i.e., those which point to rewards, evince the 
same analysis as the penal ones outlined above. To commence again with 
the Ten Commandments, the Fifth is "Honor thy father and thy mother, 
as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee; that thy days may be pro-
longed, and that it may go well with thee, in the land which the Lord thy 
God giveth thee." (Deuteronomy 5:16). In this case, the reason for keep-
ing to the Commandment appears to be that a reward will follow. No in-
trinsic reason is given 18; 19 (which may be impossible at any rate, but that 
14 This Gospel is possibly a translation of an Aramaic or Hebrew text which is lost. 
10 Matthew 7:12: "[. .. ] all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, 
do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets." 
'" Cf. R Bultmann, Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tmdition, p. 107. 
17 Cf., e.g., Sura 16:104-111. 
'"Cf., e.g., Sura 43:74, Sura 44:51-57. 
19 Hinduism, in which reincarnation into a new body by the soul after one has died 
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will be dealt with further on). 
The general motivation is presented in Deuteronomy 29:9: "Keep [ .. ,] 
the words of this covenant, and do them, that ye may prosper in all that 
ye do"20 • The reward for believing and acting as God commands liefl in be-
ing saved (e.g., Matthew 6:1-6, 7:21, 21:21-22; Romans 10:9) 21• It is stated 
in Luke 6:35: "[. .. ] love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for 
nothing again [ ... ]".This seems not to appeal to any positive results for the 
actor. Still, the passage continues"[ ... ] and your reward shall be great, 
and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto the 
unthankful and to the evil". As the conjunction connecting the sections is 
a neutral one in this case ('kai' ('and')), not introducing a final clause (as 
in the case of Matthew 7:1 mentioned above), one might argue that there 
is no necessary link with the agreeable consequences. It would be difficult, 
however, to find another reason than this for someone to be so kind to his 
enemies as is prescribed. One would have to appeal to some sort of'good-
ness' or altruism, both of which are problematic, as will be pointed out in 
sections 3 and 4, respectively. First, the second possibility, 'good' actions 
being such as a result of God's decree, needs to be examined. 
2.2. God as the basic legislator 
The interpretation of the 'good' and 'bad' actions of the previous sub-
section amounts to the conclusion that the basis for acting or refraining 
lies in the penalty or reward which may result from it. The question is 
whether the second position, according to which God decides what it 
means for something to be 'good' or 'bad', may provide another analysis. 
A basic given is God's power to both reward and punish (Deuteronomy 
11:26-28) 22• God's power is continuously implicit in this interpretation; if 
the Ten Commandments do not attest to values which are good as such (as 
in the first interpretation), their enforcement is an all the more pressing 
issue. It is, then, incumbent on man to fear God (Deuteronomy 6:2, 10:12-
13; Matthew 10:28). One may argue that Abraham, when commanded by 
God to sacrifice Isaac (Genesis 22:2-10), intended to do so on the follow-
ing basis: "Why [ ... ] does Abraham do it? For God's sake and - the two are 
wholly identical - for his own sake. He does it for God's sake because God 
demands this proof of his faith; he does it for his own sake so that he can 
is a central tenet, and the concept of God (if one may qualify it as such) differs greatly 
from that of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, proffers a different explanation from a 
metaphysical point of view, but it may be argued that the way one's deeds in life 
(Karma) are the basis for one's misery or fortune (or, rather, in Hinduism, the degree 
of misery), and one's attempt to reach 'Moksha' (the release from life) can be qualified 
in the same way from a meta-ethical point of view. 
20 Cf., e.g., Deuteronomy 8:1. 
21 Cf. Sura 19:60-61. 
22 Cf., e.g., Sura 3:189, Sura 5:40. 
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prove it" 23 • Nevertheless, it is the fear of God that is presented by God as 
the crucial reason: "And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither 
do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing 
thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me." (Genesis 22:12). 
Finally, even the man at the cross beside Christ who showed remorse 2 ' 
refers to the fear of God (Luke 23:40-42). 
The problem is evident: if the reason one is to obey God lies in His 
position as a legislator (and final judge), there doesn't seem to be a moral 
criterion. It is simply God's power, and not His or another goodness, which 
is decisive 25 . His authority would be analogous to that of the human leg-
islator. This is an important given which is to be explored in section 3. 
3.1. Selfishness as the pivotal element 
Now that the two positions have been explored, it is time to evaluate 
them, as will be done in this subsection and the next. The problem with 
the first position appears to be that no explanation is given why something 
is good. The Bible mentions the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2:17, 
3:5), but this isn't explicated. One might try to appeal to a common sense-
approach, which may have been discounted in the places referred to in 
subsection 2.1. The fact that the consequences for the actor are mentioned 
should then be ignored, but it is worthwhile to inquire whether this may 
be a viable option. 
· It seems obvious that, e.g., it is a good thing to give to the poor and 
a bad thing to commit murder. If the reasons why one acts or abstains are 
investigated, however, the issue may turn out to be more intricate than it 
seems to be at first. In this case, the self-interest I made explicit in the 
previous section (where, e.g., the rewards given by God are decisive) is not 
at stake, as I already indicated not to focus on it for now. 
A first option is that one simply gives to the poor because one may at 
some point in the future be poor oneself; for that reason, one wants oth-
ers to remember one's deed so that they (themselves having acquired 
enough means in the meantime) will reciprocate, perhaps for the same 
reason one oneself gave in the first place. The act then becomes one of 
insurance, really; one isn't sure whether one will fall on bad times, but 
should such a situation arise, it is nice to know there is a chance one won't 
be deprived of the basic 26 needs. The situation is, of course, optimal if one 
·i:i S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 59, 60. 
'" Matthew 27:38-44 and Mark 15:27-32 report that neither of the two men who 
were crucified together with Christ repented. 
"' Cf. Mackie's observation that resorting to the position that God's commands 
supply the prescriptive element in morality undermines morality itself (J. Mackie, The 
Miracle of Theism, p. 256). 
"" One may debate which needs are 'basic'; I won't deal with that in this ar1i,.+: 
as it is not a crucial issue here. 
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doesn't have to rely on the other party's willingness to return the favor or 
contributing for another reason and one lives in a society with a relatively 
stable system of distribution, 
Such a system of distribution has been implemented and expanded in 
the developed countries 27• In this case, one merely contributes (e.g., 
through taxes) because of the safety-net which is provided for oneself. 
(There are those who are rich enough not to have to worry and whose 
position might only be in danger in case of an emergency, but they don't 
have the option not to contribute. They simply pay because their voice isn't 
strong enough or, put differently, their view isn't represented to a great 
enough extent in the political process). 
A second option consists in giving to someone one cares about, like a 
friend 28. Is self~interest at stake here? The difficulty lies in the qualifica-
tion of'self. I won't'expound a discourse here that would diverge too much 
from the current theme, but the question whether one considers a friend 
(or, e.g., one's wife, or a family member) as exhibiting a special position is 
a relevant one. The sort of relation there is to another person seems, in 
many cases, to matter to one's attitude towards him or her. One may ar-
gue, then, that in this case self-interest is displayed, albeit not self-inter-
est in the sense that only the actor is at stake (abandoning his friend, wife 
or family member if that should prove to be most advantageous) but in the 
sense that one is connected to another person and on that basis wants him 
or her to prosper. 
This does, of course, call for a division within the notion of'self-inter-
est'; this variant may be dubbed 'indirect self-interest' rather than direct 
self-interest (by 'direct self-interest' I understand the self-interest which 
is at stake when one intends to serve one's own needs) 29. After all, the 
action isn't directed at a random person but just at someone whose inter-
est one wants to promote. In other words, it is in one's (indirect) self-in-
terest that the (direct) self-interest of the other party is served. This even 
extends to dying for one's friends (John 15:13), which means that one con-
siders one's indirect self-interest more important than one's direct self-
interest. Of course, it is conceivable that someone (aspires to) include ev-
eryone in his or her circle of intimates, but this is immaterial to the analy-
sis: it merely means that many beings are involved; the motivation is no 
different than in cases in which a small number of beings are at stake. 
A third option is to focus on the situation rather than on the quality 
of the relation. One may experience sympathy when one observes how 
'
1 There are varying degrees to which the basic needs can be supplied, the Scandi-
navian countries at present realizing a more elaborate program than, e.g., the United 
States, which is a result of (inter alia) political choices, but the basic structure is similar. 
·,s There is no a priori limit here - animals could also be recipients - but for 
convenience's sake I'll limit the account to human beings. 
29 The demarcation between direct and indirect self-interest may be difficult or even 
impossible to find, but that is not a problem for the analysis which is proposed here. 
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someone one doesn't even know suffers as a result of his or her lack of 
means. Does this evince altruism? The etymology of'sympathy' is helpful 
here. The word 'sympathy' is a compound of'sun' ('together') and 'pathos' 
('feeling' or 'suffering'P 0• If one takes this seriously, it is the suffering of 
oneself in observing the struggles of someone else that is at stake; the 
person in distress and the observer both suffer (albeit in different re-
spects). This means that it is really one's own suffering one wants to al-
leviate. No 'good' deeds are involved 31• 
3.2. A Satanic Stance 
If God is the propagator of 'good' and 'bad' and if His power is the 
decisive element (cf: subsection 2.2), a number of confronting questions are 
raised. Hobbes's stance is helpful in this regard. In his view, the reason 
to abstain from malicious acts is that these may have negative effects for 
oneself: "The institution of eternal punishment was before sin, arid had 
regard to this only, that men might dread to commit sin for the time to 
come" 32 • 'Good' and 'bad' are interpreted as subjective 33 until the legisla-
tor creates an - artificial - standard 34• 
As Hobbes maintains that man only acts in his own interest 35, it is not 
surprising that it is God's power which is decisive: 
'"rhe right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth 
those that break his Lawes, is to be derived not from his Creating them, as 
if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irre-
sistible Power":;,;_ 
In subsections 2.1 and 3.1, the problems with the criterion which fo. 
cuses on the content of the norm to which one is to adhere were brought 
to light. If the criterion (God's position as a legislator) also fails to display 
'
10 The phoneme In/ has changed to /m/ through regressive assimilation. 
'" Incidentally, the motivation to sympathize with other beings in Hinduism (with 
both human beings and animals) is based on the fact that one thinks •Atman' (one's 
soul) is actually identical to 'Brahman' (the whole of things) so that the explanation 
can be used here, albeit in a somewhat intricate way, too. 
""Th.Hobbes, De Cive, Ch. 4, § 9 (p. 80). 
·'" Th. Hobbes, De Ciue, Ch. 3, § 31 (p. 74); cf. De Cive, Ch. 12, § 1 (p. 146). Sig-
nificantly, Hobbes also states:"[. .. ] there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor 
Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken ofin the Books of the old Morall Phi-
losophers." (Leviathan, Ch. 11 (p. 160)). 
31 Th. Hobbes, De Cive, Ch. 12, § l (p. 146); Leviathan, Ch. 29 (p. 365); cf. Ch. 46 
(p. 697). 
a5 "[ ... ] of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himselfe." 
(Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 14 (p. 192)). I do not completely agree with Hobbes at this 
point as he seems to leave no room for the indirect self-interest I discerned (in my 
terminology, he reduces all motivation to direct self-interest), but that doesn't matter 
for the analysis of the current issue. 
"" Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 31 (p. 397) (cf, De Give, Ch. 15, § 5 (p. 185)). 
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a moral element, why would it be moral to obey God? In fact, if the power 
criterion is determinative, one might argue that it would be incumbent on 
man, acting in his self-interest, to obey Satan, if he should prove to be 
more powerful than God. Just to be clear, this is not what I myself pro-
pose. After all, if the Christian doctrine is correct, God is more powerful 
than Satan (cf., e.g., Job 1:12, Revelation 12:8-9); and ifit is not, I am not 
inclined to such a course of action on the basis of any conviction. In fact, 
with regard to the question whether God (or Satan, for that matter) exists, 
I must suspend my judgment as I have no means to establish His exist-
ence or non-existence. It may be objected that such a conviction is present 
in some who on that basis stiil find a reason to act in accordance with 
God's dictates; they are presumed to simply grasp that it is good (or bad) 
to do something and to find a directive on that basis. I will try to counter 
such an objection in section 4. 
4. Meta-ethical considerations 
In order to attempt to unnerve the results reached in the foregoing, 
one might try to appeal to 'good' and 'bad' (or 'evil'). Don't the issues men-
tioned attest to these notions? Isn't it, e.g., simply good to give to the poor? 
From an ethical point of view, this may indeed be argued. At that level, the 
pivotal question is: 'what is good?'; one seeks to do good things. The meta• 
ethical question, and that is the one at stake here, is: 'what is 'good'?' The 
meaning (if any) of the ethical notions is concerned. 
One may adduce that it is not because of the agreeable results that 
one acts but, conversely, that rewards are sought because they are consid-
ered good37 • In a similar vein, it may be stated that 
"it is necessary for evil men to be unhappier when they have accom~ 
plished what they longed for than if they might be unable to implement the 
things they long for."("[ ... ] infeliciores esse necesse est malos cum cupita 
perfecerint, quam si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint") 38. 
Augustine indicates that happiness is only attainable for those who 
do not seek after evil39 • 
The problem in these accounts is that they presuppose the existence 
of good and evil; it isn't clarified how this may be maintained and what it 
means. If these notions can't be maintained for that reason, does that also 
mean that the difference between doing something out of selfish motives 
and for a moral reason is cancelled, reducing the latter to the former? 
Abelard makes the following distinctions: 
"
7 Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, 4, 3, 7 (p. 109). 
""Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, 4, 4, 3 (p. 113). 
'·'" Augustine, De Trinitate, 13, 6, 9 (pp. 286/287, 288/289). 
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"[ ... ] repentance at one time happens out oflove for God and is fruitful, 
at another because of some penalty with which we do not want to be bur-
dened [ ... ]."•0; "Daily[ ... ] we see many about to depart from this life repent-
ing of their shameful accomplishments and groaning with great compunction, 
not so much out oflove of God whom they have offended or out of hatred of 
the sin which they have committed as out of fear of the punishment into 
which they are afraid of being hurled" 41 . 
Assuming one acts out of love of God, if one does, it is not the direct 
self-interest which is concerned (as would be the case if one were to act to 
avoid punishment), but the indirect self-interest (cf. subsection 3.1). One 
simply prefers acting out of love of God to sinning. Of course, it may be 
objected that one has faith without being able to know (through reason) 
whether one will be rewarded or punished. Doesn't this evince the righ-
teousness of the believer? Firstly, if this is his position, his faith is blind; 
he has no ground to believe in anything rather than in anything else and 
any conviction (if one may call it that) he has is random. The religion to 
which he adheres is interchangeable for another, precisely because of the 
fact that he has no reason to cling to one rather than to another 42 • Sec-
ondly, this course of action doesn't appear to differ from insuring one's 
possessions (not knowing whether something may happen to them), where 
paying the premium is similar to performing the 'good' deeds. By contrast, 
if one is able to know whether a reward or punishment will ensue, the 
major premise of the objection is cancelled. 
The objection that one acts from an insight into what is 'good' and 
'bad' can still be proposed. One acts in accordance with the Ten Command-
ments, e.g., because one acknowledges their value. I can't prove that those 
who have an intuition of this sort are wrong. It is, however, doubtful 
whether their position is tenable. Is there such a thing as an intrinsic good 
quality? The Bible isn't helpful here. In the statement that "The Lord is 
good, a strong hold in the day of trouble [. .. ] ." (Nahum 1:7), is 'a strong 
hold in the day of trouble' the reason why He is good? If so, the positive ef-
fects of His actions are simply posited and 'good' should be understood as 
'agreeable' or 'useful'. If not, no reason for His goodness is given. 
Leaving the Bible aside, it is difficult in general, having analyzed the 
elements involved in actions, to find 'goodness', especially if one considers 
accounts such as Mackie's argument from queerness, indicating that it is 
hard to see how moral qualities would fit with the things with which one 
is acquainted 43 • It is, then, up to those who appeal to intuitions, to inquire 
whether these really pertain to 'good' and 'bad' elements or whether they 
may be reduced to other elements than these. 
"' P. Abelard, Ethics, p. 76/77. 
" P. Abelard, Ethics, p. 78179. 
" In fact, this is my position. This is the reason why I suspend judgment with 
regard to the issue which religion is the right one (if any) and consider myself an ag-
nostic. 
·"' J. Mackie, Ethics. Inuenting Right and Wrong, pp. 38-42. 
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Conclusion 
In this article, I have attempted tO" ascertain whether moral elements 
may be present in religion, having focused on the Christian faith. A num-
ber ofresults were reached which may be perceived by some as radical. It 
was my intention to inquire as critically as possible, not eschewing any 
conclusion a priori. Still, the outcome doesn't necessarily lead to far-reach-
ing practical changes. In particular, no reasons not to adhere to Christian-
ity (or any other religion) were brought to the fore. By contrast, I have 
concentrated on the specific motivation to do so. This culminated in two 
perspectives. 
If one is to act on account of an acknowledgment of the (inherent) 
goodness or wickedness of some things, it is important to find out whether 
such qualities may be said to exist at all. The reason frequently given in 
the Bible (a reward or punishment which is to follow) merely points to a 
selfish perspective and discollilts an alternative explanation. 
The same analysis can be applied to the situation in which God's 
power is the central issue. Selfishness may be advanced in general as the 
basic drive to act. A meta-ethical inquiry also poses some difficult ques-
tions (not only to religions, but to a number of philosophies as well) which 
can't be ignored. This is not necessarily detrimental to the position of re-
ligions; it does mean that some of the doctrines pertaining to reasons for 
adhering to them may be up for critical revision. Still, it will mean that the 
followers of religions will be able to maintain them in a world in which 
their tenets are ever more critically questioned. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this article, it is inquired which reasons are decisive for acting in accor-
dance with divine commands, and whether these can be regarded as moral rea-
sons; the emphasis lies on Christianity. To this effect, the position of God as a -
basic - lawgiver is expounded, with special attention to the role His power plays. 
By rneans of an account of the grounds given (in the Bible) to obey G-od, the self-
ish motives in this respect are brought to light. It is questioned whether any other 
elements can be discerned, particularly from a meta-ethical perspective. 
